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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RUSSELL \V·. YOUNG and
SABA 0. YOUNG, his wife,
.A.ppellants,
Case No.

vs.

7428

ELVIS HANSEN and
BO~XIE HANSEN, his wife,
Respondents.

Brief of Respondents
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The purported statement of facts of appellants is a
misnomer. At most it is a purported statement of the
pleadings and the decision-imperfectly and inadequately stated. The purported facts are strewn through the
. argument, quoting primarily the testimony of plaintiffs
and such portions of the evidence of defendants as they
felt suited their particular purpose. In that manner the
facts are thrown into the brief in such a hodgepodge manner that it is almost impossible to obtain a ''concise statement of the facts'' as required by Rule VIII. We shall,
therefore, restate the case.
1
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PLEADINGS
Plaintiffs' amended complaint IS one for alleged
breach of contract for the sale by defendants to plaintiffs of an undivided one-half interest in certain real
property and some pigs, rabbits, chickens and other incidental farm property. Plaintiffs alleged that the sale
price of the half interest was to be $9000, payable on
November 15, 1948 from the proceeds of a sale of a
certain home belonging to plaintiffs at 3348 South State
Street, and if the home was not sold by Nov. 15, 1948 that
plaintiffs were to pay $50.00 per month until the home
was sold, the $50.00 per month to apply upon the purchase price; that there was a $2,000 mortgage on the
farm, which defendants were to clear; that it was also a
part of the agreement that plaintiffs were to move onto
the farm with defendants, and that the parties would
enter into a partnership agreement and operate the farm
in the raising and sale of rabbits, chickens, pigs, etc., the
exact terms of which partnership agreement were to be
later determined.
Plaintiffs further alleged that early in· July, 1948
the agreement was modified by the parties in the follo·wing particulars: That plaintiffs were to pay $4,000 on the
pu-rchase price at that time and that upon payment of the
$4,000 defendants were to i1nmediately and forth~vith
give plaintiffs a warranty deed and bill of sale to a half
interest in the real and personal property and execute a
partnership agreement. That plaintiffs thereupon raised
the $4,000 by mortgaging the State Street property and
paid it to defendants and received an additional credit
of $60 for some incidental personal property.
2
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Plaintiffs further allL\ged that on or about August 1,
1948 they moYed onto the farm and paid certain moneys
and expended labor in looking after the pigs, chickens,
rabbits, etc.; that defendants then promised that if
plaintiffs ,,~ould "\Yait until NoYember 15, 1948 they would
then execute the deed, bill of sale and partnership agreement; but "\Yhen November 15, 1948 came they did not do
so; and that. on or about February 15, 1949, after repeated delays, defendants refused to execute the deed, bill of
sale a!J-d agreement of partnership, or either .of them, and
refused to execute any papers to carry out the oral understanding, and that defendants have requested plaintiffs
to leaYe the premises.
Plaintiffs prayed judgment for breach of contract,
claiming a right to repayment of $4060 plus the value of
their labor and expenditures on the pigs, chickens, rabbits, etc., a. total of $5,145.93 plus interest.
Thereafter, befole trial, the amended complaint "\vas
amended by interlineation to include the allegation that
plaintiffs were at all times ready and willing to perform
their part of said agreement.
To this amended complaint defendants, by their
answer, admitted the agreement to sell an undivided onehalf interest in the real and personal property for $9,000
payable on or before November 15, 1948; admitted payment of the $4000 plus an additional credit of $60 for the
incidental personal property; admitted that a partnership for operation of the property was to be formed; ad3
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mitted that plaintiffs moved onto the property and that
the parties operated the property as a joint enterprise;
and admitted that they refused to deed over the one-half
interest in the property for $4,060. They denied the alleged modification of the agreement in July, 1948; denied
that they had breached the agreement; and on the other
hand alleged that plaintiffs had breached the agreement
by failing to pay the balance of the $9,000 and by repudiating the agreement and by demanding the deed and bill
of_ sale upon the basis of the alleged modification requiring the same upon payment of $4060; and by notifying
defendants that they were not intending to go ahead with
the original agreement as to operation of the farm, etc.,
and by demanding a return of their money plus damages.
Upon these issues the case went to trial. There was
a direct and irreconcilable conflict in the evidence upon
the main issues as· follows:
(a)

Was the original contract modified 1

(b) If not, did defendants breach the contract so
as to entitle plan tiffs to a money judgment as prayed~
The trial court found that the original contract was
substantially as pleaded and admitted by both parties ;
that it called for payment of $9,000 by plaintiffs to defendants on or before November 15, 1948, at which time
defendants were to give the deed, bill of sale and make
the partnership agreement; that it was agreed that until
that time the property should be operated as a joint enterprise, each putting in half and taking out half in expenses
4
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and net proceeds; that the parties had so operated the
property and the net proceeds had been distributed and
the livestock had been disposed of; that the original contract had not been modified in July 1948 as alleged by
plain tiffs ; that plaintiffs failed to pay the balance of the ·
purchase price on or after November 15, 1948 and that
during the month of February, 1949 plaintiffs demanded
that they be reimbursed for their expenditures; and concluded therefrom that defendants had not violated the
agreement; and that plaintiffs were not entitled to a judgment against defendants for breach of agreement; and
that a judgment in favor of defendants, ''No cause of
action'' should be entered.
A judgment was entered accordingly.

ARGUMENT
The questions on appeal, therefore, are as follows :
(a) Was there substantial evidence to sustain the
findings of fact~
(b)

Did the court err 1n its conclusions of law·

therefrom~

(c) Did the court err in its rulings with reference
to admitting evidence~
At the outset it is well to remember that this is an
action at law for breach of contract, for money damages
therefor, and that as such the findings of fact of the trial
court are to be sustained if supported by competent
evidence. Counsel for plaintiffs seems to base his appeal
5
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upon the erroneous idea that inclusion in his prayer of
the stock phrase, ''and for such other relief as to the
court ·may -seem proper in the premises'' has the magic
effect of transforming it into an equity case; that on this
appeal this court should review the evidence and decide
that the trial court should have believed his clients; that
the facts were as testified by his clients (in spite of the
fact that the trial court did not believe their evidence as
against that of defendants); that the trial court or this
court should become attorneys for plaintiffs and tell them
how to proceed by some action of some kind, or how to
amend their pleadings in some hoped-for retrial of this
case, so that they as contract violators can get some
money damages from defendants \\Tho did not violate their
contract. That, in substance, is the purpose and hope
of this appeal.
In this connection it will be observed that the defendants never declared a default in the contract up to the
time of trial. It is not a case involving an improper
declaration of default and forfeiture. And as Judge
VanCott stated, (R. 169), all that plaintiffs had to do, in
order to get all that they bought, was to make a legal
tender, as distinguished from the lip tender that they
testified to, and which defendants denied, and then demand their deed and if they didn't get it sue for specific
performance. Instead of that they \Va.nted their money
back plus damages for breach of contract. This the trial
court refused to give them and the evidence supports
the judgment.
6
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Let us now proc.eed to consider the alleged errors.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND IN
F .A.'TOR OF DEFENDANTS, NO CAUSE OF ACTION.
Appellants' first point is that the trial court erred
in rendering a judg·ment "no cause of action" on the
complaint for breach of contract; and that under the
prayer for ''such other relief as to the court may seem
proper in the premises'' the trial court should have proceeded to treat the case as a proceeding in equity for dissolution of a partnership, and, upon that basis, give
plaintiffs some money judgment against defendants.
In effect appellants are asking this court to tell the
trial courts of this State that the pleadings mean nothing
so long as you include in your prayer a demand for general relief. That, of course, is not and never has been
the la \Y. The pleadings define the issues to be tried and
limit the power of the court. In fact, a judgment which
has no foundation in the pleadings, or goes beyond the
pleadings, is a nullity.
Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 Pac. 83:
''We, of course, must assume that the court
made its order upon and within the issue presented by the petition and that it did not go beyond it.
It matters not what court acts. Every court must
acquire jurisdiction from its record which every
court must have and keep _and which binds the
court; and there is no principle better established
than what is not juridically presented cannot be
juridically decided. Just as elemental is it that
pleadings are the juridical means of investing a
7
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court with jurisdiction of the subject-matter to
adjudicate it and that a judgment or decree beyond or not within them is a nullity, for the court
is bound by its record. These are immutable
elements.''
Stevens & Wallis v. Golden Porphyry Mines Co.,
81 Utah 414, 18 Pac. 2d 903:
''It is of course familiar doctrine that the
plaintiff cannot recover upon a different cause of
action from that which is alleged, and that he
must recover according to the allegations of his
complaint; that courts cannot make the complaint
for one thing stand for a different thing. In other
words, the recovery must be secondum allegata
et probata, and as was stated by Mr. Justice
Swayne in the case of Washington, A. & G. R. Co.
v. Bradleys, 10 Wall. 299, 303, 19 L. Ed. 894, that
'allegations and proofs must agree' and that
'averments without proofs. and proofs without
averments are alike unavailing,' and that the judgment must conform to the scope and object of the
pleadings. '' ·
Had the trial court, upon a complaint for money
damages for breach of contract, entered a decree in equity
for dissolution of a partnership which both parties alleged did not then exist, and upon that basis give a
money judgment against defendants, such judgment
would have had no foundation in the pleadings beyond
the issues presented by the pleadings, and a nullity.
Neither party alleged that the partnership had been
formed and that the property belonged to the partnership. Plaintiffs were not to have a half interest in the
property until they had paid the full $9,000. Plaintiffs
8
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nlleged that it 'Yas an oral contract for purchase of a half
interest in the property and demanded damages for
breach of the contract. They alleged that the partnership
"ras to be formed after the purchase price was paid. Defendants admitted the original contract, denied that it
had been modified, denied that defendants had breached
the contract, and alleged that plaintiffs had themselves
breached the contract as alleged in the ans\ver. The defendants further alleged that in the meantime the parties
had operated a joint enterprise, contributing equally to
the expenses and sharing equally in the net proceeds,
after payment of the expenses. This the trial court found
to be true. Payment of the purchase price of the half
interest was a condition precedent to the formation of the
partnership, which was to be the relationship of the
,parties after plaintiffs had paid for their half of the
property. There was ample evidence to sustain the finding of the trial court on this issue.
Nor is the evidence to the contrary. Appellant refers
to the statement of defendant Elvis Hansen (R. 148)
wherein he said, in answer to a question of counsel for
plaintiffs, as follows :

"Q.

l-Ie "\vas to take care of the

"A.

It was a partnership."

hogs~"

A fair reading of the entire line of questioning shows
that counsel was asking as to whether there was a division of responsibility in the doing of the chores and work
about the place. The answer was merely the method used
by the 'vitness to state that in the doing of the work there
9
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was no division. Each was doing and responsible for
helping with all of it. On the following page (R. 149) the
witness clearly stated that the agreement was that the
partnership agreement was to be dra,vn up after the remaining $5,000 was paid.
Also it will be observed that ( R. 149) the I-Iansens
had consulted Judge Allen of ~{urray about drawing up
the papers to effectuate the deal; that he requested Mr.
Young to see Judge Allen or ·have his attorney do so,
but Mr. Young refused to do so. This "\Vas in January or
February. Notwithstanding the fact that the November
15, 1948 payment had not been made by plaintiffs no default had been declared by the Hansens and not\vithstancling the fact that some disagreements had arisen, the
Hansens were willing to give the Youngs everything they
were to get, if they would pay for it. But the Youngs did
not want to go ahead with the deal. Instead they wanted
their money back, plus damages for a purported breach
of a purported modified contract; and so instead of going
ahead and completing the deal they chose to file a suit for
money damages. (R. 101)
Plaintiffs' whole idea, in the allegations of their
amended complaint, in their theory at the trial, and on
this appeal, is that because they paid $4060 on the purchase price of something that l\f r. Young didn't want in
the first place and wanted less after they had tried it for
a few months, that they should be entitled to their money
back as damages. In order to do this they eonc.octed the
idea of a modification of the agreement and then alleged
that defenants had breached the agreement as modified.
10
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The alleged modification is silly in the extreme. It
is no wonder the trial court refused to believe that by the
modfication the Hansens agreed to convey the half interest for $4,000 and then let the Youngs pay the balance
at the rate of $50 per month, '\Then the contract called for
them to pay the full $9,000 by November 15, 1948. The
Youngs testified that they had the money and could have
paid the balance. Why didn't they do it then' Because
they didn't want to put any more money into it. They
wanted their money out-not more money in (R.101Testimony of Mr. Young).
Their amendment stating that they were willing to
pay the balance was made at the time of trial. It was a
last minute change of mind on the part of the Youngsafter they had repudiated the agreement themselves
and had brought a suit for money damages for breach of
contract. The Hansens were perfectly within their right
in saying that they felt the Youngs had materially breached the contract and that they, by their breach, had absolved the defendants from the obligations of the
contract.
The Youngs are not the only ones in the world who
have bought something which they felt that they didn't
want after they had made a partial payment on account.
That is a common experience "'ith most of us. Nor are
they the first to try to get their money back after changing their minds. lVIost people who change their minds
on those things find it difficult to get out of the obligation to pay the balance. But if they succeed in this lawsuit they \Yill he the first litigants in history to obtain
11
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damages for their own breach from people who were not
guilty of breaching the contract and who were ready and
willing to go ahead with the contract right up to the time
the suit was filed.
Let us hear Mr. Young speak as to what his attitude
was early in the year 1948 when the IIansens were trying
to· get him to go down to see. Judge Allen :

"Q.

Now, early in 1949, you were making demand upon the Hansens for your money
back, were you not~

''A. Yes.
'' Q.

You demanded a note and mortgage upon
the farm, did you not~''

"A. Yes."
Counsel for appellant seems to be imbued with the
idea that everyone who puts money into a proposition,
regardless of the contract, is entitled to get his money
out of it on some theory, regardless of the pleadings and
evidence. All you have to do, according to his idea of
law, is show that you paid in some money and then bring
an. action, regardless of the type, and then insert in the
prayer a demand for general relief. From there on the
trial court or the appellate court is supposed to take over
as attorney for the plaintiff and give you something
back, on the basis that the code has done R\vay with the
difference between law and equity, and something good
should. result That, in effect, is what counsel for appellant is proposing to this court.

12
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There 'Yere no allegations in the complaint invoking
the equity jurisdiction of the court, nor 'vas any attempt
made to state any cause of action in equity. It was purely
and simply a cause of action for breach of contract. The
necessary incidents of the agreement 'vere alleged by both
parties, the alleged breach by defendant and the claim for
damages, and the alleged breach by plaintiffs. Those
were the issues framed by the pleadings. The trial court
found that plaintiffs had not established their case and
ordered a judgment "no cause of action". Appellants
say the court was in error.
In an action for breach of contract a judgment ''no
cause of action'' simply means that the plaintiff has not
proven his case. This court in the case of Mace v.
Tingey, 106 Utah 420, 149 Pac. 2d 832, has directly ruled
on this question wherein it said:
''This brings us to the last assignment of
error: that the verdict is contrary to, and not supported by, the evidence. Of course a verdict for
defendant' no cause of action need not be supported by any evidence at all unless the answer is a
confession and avoidance-one which puts the full
burden of proof on defendant. Is the verdict contrary to the evidence~ Generally the donee has
the burden of proving a gift. Blackburn v. Jones,
59 Utah 558, 205 P. 582; Ward v. Ward, 94 Or.
405, 185 P. 906. But when an action is brought
to recover money alleged to have been loaned by
plaintiff to defendant under an oral contract, and
defendant claims the money was a gift, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the alleged oral
agreement to repay. Payne v. Williams, 62 Colo.
86, 160 P. 196. Ordinarily there is no presumption against a gift. Jackson v. Lamar, 67 Wash.
13
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385, 121 P. 857. There was here no witness who
testified directly as to the transaction. Plaintiff
produced witnesses, beneficiaries under the will,
or relatives, who testified that defendant told
them the money was a loan and that she should
have signed a note. The so-called 'dead man statute,' Subdivision 3 of 104-49-2 U.C.A. 1943, was
invoked by plaintiff to prevent defendant testifying as to what actually occurred when the money
changed hands. Defendant, as a witness however,
denied making the statements attributed to her
by plaintiff's witnesses. She offered a witness
who corroborated her denial that she had
stated the money was a loan; another witness
testified that deceased had t~ld him she had given
defendant the money. Evidence, some phases of
which we have discussed in connection with other
questions, was offered by both sides relative to
the relationship between deceased and the beneficiaries under the will; also between deceased
and the defendant. There was a direct conflict in
the evidence as to whether the tra.nsaction 1vas a
loam or a gift. The question was properly subm.itted to the fury. If found for defendant, no
caruse of action. The verdict is not contrary to the
evidence.''
Of course the case at bar does not rest on failure of proof
on the part of defendants. There is competent, affirmative
evidence to support the findings and judgment.
The trial court disposed of all of the issues raised in
the case and presented by the pleadings. Now defeated
on the action, pleadings and the case presented, and all of
which was chosen by them, appellants seek by this
appeal to present another matter (whatever it is) without issues or evidence. Miller v. Johnson (on Rehearing),

14
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. 43 Utah 468, 134 P. 1017 ....~\ppellants further set up cer-

tain facts ns the gospel truth but it is evident from the
judgment that the trial court failed to entertain that
Yie''?· 1\s claimed by appellants, respondents did come to
issue \Yith them upon the \'"arious items, not of account
ns no\v they are designated but of damages, and appellants failed in their action.
The relief in any action must be consistent with the
issues presented and the case made and even under the
libera.lit3~ of the Code a plaintiff may not plead his action,
frame his issues at his O\vn election, and then upon failure, ".,.ithout amendment, abandon the case made and
framed by him and recover in a different form of action
than the one he selected. This has been consistently true
since the time of the adoption of the Code. Davis v. Utah
. Southern R. Co., 3 Utah 218, 2 Pac. 521.

IS THE

CO~{CLUSION

THAT THE DEFENDANTS
DID XOT VIOLATE THE TERMS OF THE
AGREEMENT ERROR~

The trial coul~t concluded as a matter of law that
Llcfendants had not violated the contract.
This conclusion of law \Vas based upon Findings of
Fact III, IV, V, VI, VII and 'TIII, \vherein the court
found that the contract had not been modified as alleged
and claimed by plaintiffs, and wherein the court found the
facts showing full anl substantial performance by defendants of all that they had agreed to do, and wherein
the court found that the plaintiffs themselves breached
the agreement.

15
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Defendants were to do nothing further with reference to conveying the title until plaintiffs paid the
balance.
What are the breaches of contract alleged 1n the
amended complaint~
(a) Refusal to make the deed, bill of sale and
partnership agreement in July, 1948, upon payment of
the $4,000.00.
(b) Refusal to make the deed, bill of sale and
partnership agreement in November.
(c) Refusal to make the same in February and repudiation of the agreement by demanding that plaintiffs
move.
All of these allegations of breach were predicated
upon the theory that defendants breached the alleged
modification. In other words, they claimed that defendants refused to make the deed upon payment of $4060.00
and permit plaintiffs to pay the balance at $50.00 per
month.
When the trial court found that no such contract
existed as claimed by plaintiffs, it follows as a matter
of course that defendants could not and did not violate
a provision which did not exist.
It certainly cannot be contended that there is no evidence to sustain the finding that the original contract
was not modified.

16
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Defendants testified that in January and February,
in fact before that, they hired Judge Allen of Murray
to prepare all of the papers upon the assumption that
plaintiffs intended to pay the balance, but plaintiffs refused to go see Judge Allen or have their attorney see
him. They "\Yonld have none of it. They had in mind
getting their money back.
Defendants denied that plaintiffs had ever made any
tenders of money to them.
Defendants not only "\Yere willing to go ahead with
the deal up to the time of filing the action, had never
declared any default, but had engaged a reputable lawyer
to prepare the papers. That is the very essence of good
faith. They were more than indulgent of the failure of
plaintiffs to pay.
But "\Yhen someone in default in payments brings a
suit against you for return of his money, plus damages,
repudiates the contract and claims that you made a contract that you did not make, all for the purpose of getting·
out of a deal and getting his money back, that is a different matter. Defendants' testimony that he was not
willing to go ahead was his evidence as to his attitude
at that time-not his attitude before the suit. Under the
law he was justified in regarding the suit for breach
of contract, coupled with the failure of plaintiffs to pay
or tender payment as a material breach of the contract,
w·hich it was.
Whether plaintiffs have any other, different, or further remedies in the 1ight of the present situation is not

17
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before this court for decision. The sole question is: did
defendants violate the contract as proven so as to make
them liable in damages~ The evidence supports the judgment and decision of the trial court that they did not.
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW A.RE PROPERLY
SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT.
It is fundamental that the support of a Conclusion
of Law rests within the Findings of Fact. It is submitted,
and it is apparently conceded, that the Findings herein
support the Conclusions of La\\T.
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT ON QUESTIONS
OF FACT WILL NOT BE DISTURBED UNLESS
lVIANIFESTLY ERRONEOUS.
Appellants' points 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of their argument
are all directed at certain Findings of Fact as made by
the trial court. It has been firmly and definitely settled
over a long period of time by this court that the trial
court may determine the facts and judge the credibility
of witnesses, and, if supported by any substantial evidence, the finding of fact will not be disturbed on appeal.
DeCorso v. Booth, 97 Utah 145, 91 Pae. 2d 449; Farrel Y.
Cameron, 98 Utah 68, 94 Pac. 2d 1068; Romney v. Covey
Garage, 100 Utah 167, 111 Pac. 2nd 545; Yowell v. Occidental Life Ins., 100 Utah 120, 110 Pac. 2d 566. As a
matter of fact in DeCorso v. Booth, supra, this court
stated that this rule is so well settled ''that citation of
authorities should not be necessary."
18
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As point 4 of appellants' argument it is contended
that there is no evidence supporting that of Finding III
that ''"~hen plaintiffs paid the defendants the sum of
$9000.00 * * * that the parties 'vould then enter into a
partnership agreement' ' and that there is no evidence
' __ 'That the said $9000.00 should be paid to defendants
on or before X ovember 13, 1948. '' As to substantial evidence supporting these findings the court's attention
is invited to the following:

"Q.

'' .\.
_'":\._

'' Q.

" . .~.
'' Q.

''A.
'' Q.

"A.

I'll ask you to state, ~fr. Hansen, whether or
not you ever had an arrangement with the
Youngs for the payment of fifty dollars a
month commencing on November 15, 1948 ~
N o, sir.
.
..Lc\_nd did you ever have an agreement for the
payment of that sum subsequent to that
time?
No, sir." (R. 135)
All right, after this agreement when were
you to give him the title~
When the nine thousand dollars was fully
paid-on November 15th or right after.
Didn't he offer to pay you the the balance
of the nine thousand dollars right after
November 15th if you would have the
papers made out~
No, sir." (R. 146)
..L

*

* * * *

"Q. And in what way~ (Was he getting jittery)
"A. Because at the end of November 15th when
the deal was to be closed, it hadn't been
closed." (R. 147)

*

*
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"Q.

Now do you recall, Mrs. Hansen, what the
agreement was as to how that nine thousand
dollars was to be paid~
"A. The way I understood it, it was supposed to
be paid on or shortly after the 15th of November.'' (R. 154-155)

* * * * *
'' Q. Now in this original agreement, suppose
their house wasn't sold by November 15th,
what was the arrangement~
"A. The understanding that I had was that Mr.
Young would get it through other sources.''
(R. 158)
Appellants fail to argue Assignments of Error 5 and
6 and no reply is necessary by respondents.
In Assignment of Error No. 7 it is claimed that
there is no evidence to support Finding VII that the net
proceeds of the joint operation and the expenses were
divided equally between the parties. As to substantial
evidence supporting this finding the court's attention
is invited to the following:

"Q. And what happened to that livestock~
''A. It was sold, except the rabbits, and equally
divided.
'' Q. And did Mr. Hansen receive half of the
money that you received for that livestock~
''A. Mr. Hansen or Mr. Young~
"Q. I mean the plaintiff.
"A. Mr. Young received half.
'' Q. In every case~
''A. In every case except one.
20
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"Q. ....\.nd ""hat one '"'as that '1
"A. That '"'as the last amount of pigs that I sold
'"'hen he accused me of selling them and
uever giving him the money. It was sold
on his own request.
"Q. What happened to the money~
'' . .\.. I kept it for the expense of the truck that
accumulated in the year's time or in the
time.
'' Q. Was it your truck that was being used all
of this time '?
'• A. Y es,sir. In fact two of them.
'' Q. Two of your trucks~
'' . A._. Two trucks.'' ( R. 138)
.._\s point 8 of appellants' argument it is contended
that there is no evidence to support making a part of Finding No. VIII, that on or after November 15, 1948 plaintiffs failed, neglected, and refused to pay the balance of
said purchase price. As to substantial evidence to support this finding the court's attention is invited to the
follo,Ying:

'' Q.

Was the balance of five thousand dollars
ever paid~
"A. No.
"Q. Was it ever offered to you prior to the commencement of this action~
"A. N o, sir.
.

'' Q.

And never during the times mentioned here
today has that been offered to you, is that
correct~

''A. No, sir.'' (R. 135)
*

*
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'' Q.

In regard to the fifty dollar matter, was
there any payments of fifty dollars ever offered to you~
"A. No, sir." (R. 136)

*
'' Q.
''A.

'' Q.

"A.

'' Q.
"A.
"Q.

*

* * *

All right, after this agreement when were
·you to give him the title~
When the nine thousand dollars was fully
paid on November 15th or right after.
Didn't he offer to pay you the balance of
the nine thousand dollars right after November 15th if you would have the papers
made out~
No, sir." (R. 146)
* * * * *.
Do you know if the balance of five thousand
dollars was ever paid~
No, sir.
Do you know if it was ever offered to your
husband~

"A. No, sir.
'' Q. Was there any of it after the 15th of November ever offered or paid to you~
"A. No, sir.
'' Q. Was there any ever tendered~
"A. No, sir.
The Court : I think you asked here if any of
it was ever paid and she said, 'No, sir.'
"A. It has never been paid or been paid up to
this date.
"Q. And I think I asked you has it ever been
tendered~

"A.

No." (R. 155-156)

Appellants here have done exactly what this court
detected in the De Corso case, supra. Appellants complain and assail the findings of the trial court. because
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it adopted the defendants' evidence with respect thereto
rather than that adduced by plaintiffs upon the subject.
It is submitted that ail of the findings of fact attacked
by appellants are "'"ell supported by substantial evidence
to maintain them and this court, in a.la\Y action, is bound
by these findings and it is not a basis of reversal, even,
in the words of the Yowell case, supra, "If we are inclined to arrive at a different conclusion than the trial judge.
Fee Y. X ationa.l Bank, 37 Utah 28, 106 Pac. 517."
RECEPTION OF EXHIBIT I WAS PROPER
Counsel for appellants reads a great deal of his
own \Yishful thinking into the evidence and it is his o~.
conclusion and that of no one else that Exhibit I was ali
attempt for a compromise settlement. Nowhere in· the eYidence does it appear that these parties were engaged
in or negotiating for any kind of a settlement and no
spirit of compromise and settlement pervaded the occa-sion. It "~as no offer but the presentment of a claim and
demand. -'-L\_ppellants voluntarily presented to the Han~
sens a statement concerning their alleged claims. As· a
matter of fact the Exhibit was introduced only to show
the great difference between the demands of their action,
the demands as shown by their evidence and their previous demands. It simply discredited appellants as to
the knowledge of truth of their testimony and sworn complaint. It was evidence of an independent fact which is
certinly and properly admissable.
The foundation for reception of Exhibit I was
properly laid by sho,ving that it was presented as a
computation and demand. (R. 102-104)
23
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CONCLUSION

This appeal has two purposes: (a) to have this court
reverse the trial court on its findings that the contract
was never modified as alleged by the plaintiffs and
denied by the defendants; or to reverse the finding that
the defendants did not breach the contract; or (b) to send
the case back on some theory, regardless of what it may
be, so that it can be retried on some theory other than
breach of contract, the theory upon which it was filed
and tried. We respectfully submit that in a law case
involving breach of contract the only question before
this court on the two main questions is as to whether
there was substantial competent evidence to support
the judgment. The two principal issues were: What
as the contract, and did the defendants breach it so
as to make them liable in damages~ Upon those issues
the evidence was in conflict and the trial court found
that plaintiffs had not sustained the burden of proof.
So far as this case is concerned that is where it should
begin and end.
"\\7

This is not so much an appeal by appellants upon the
real merits of the case as framed by _the pleadings and
tried by the court, but an attempt on the part of appellants to impress this court with the fact that somehow in
some action not before the court they should get their
money back, plus damages, and they wander in the wilderness, quoting at random from bits of evidence, mostly
their own, seeking a guiding hand and advice from this
court as to how they shall proceed to accomplish their
purpose which has been, ever s1nce they could not se1l
24
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their State Street home for $16,000.00, how to get their
money back rather than to fulfil their contract.
\"\Thy vras this la,Ysnit started '1 The Hansens never
declared a default not,Yithstanding the failure to pay on
X ovember 15, 1948. They had placed the matter with
Judge Allen of l\lurray to prepare the papers, notwithstanding some minor differences had arisen. One. of the
papers to be dra,vn was the partnership agreement,
which obviously took a consultation with both parties.
The Youngs were notified of this. Mrs. Young so testi~
fied (R. 122). They never 'vent near Judge Allen. It
seems strange that the attorney for plaintiffs never contaeted him before bringing a lawsuit, if they wanted to go
ahead with the contract. That was not what they wanted.
The record is replete with evid,ence of both parties that
from November 15, 1948 on the only interest of the
y oungs was in getting their money back plus an accounting for the joint venture.. They demanded it time
and time again, according to the evidence of both parties-.
We have no doubt, if the Youngs sincerely wanted to perform their contract and complete the purchase of their
half interest, that a simple effort in that regard with
Judge Allen would have produced the deed and an agreement for further operations if it was still desired. But
that was not what the plaintiffs wanted. They wanted
their money out-not more money in. That is why they
brought an action for breach of contract instead of
specific performance with a tender of the balance due.
According to the testimony of Mr. Young {R. 76),, Mr.
IIansen even offered to stand half of any loss in dis25
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counting the contracts which Mr. Young had with Dr.
Marlin if the Youngs would go ahead, but the Youngs
didn't want to go ahead-they wanted to call it off and
get a note and mortgage from the Hansens. That is why
the lawsuit for money damages for purported breach of
contract was filed instead of making an effort with Judge
Allen to get the papers completed. When they breached
and repudiated the contract themselves, not only by failing to pay but by demanding that defendants repay them
their money and respond in damages, and then started a
lawsuit upon the basis of a contract that never existed
and alleged breach of contract that never existed, they
placed themselves in a position where, so far is this case
is concerned, they must stand or fall on the law case for
breach of contract. Whether they do or do not have some
other or different remedy in the light of their conduct is
not before this court on this appeal. The only question
before this court is : Are they entitled to recover for
breach of contract as alleged~ We respectfully submit
that there was ample evidence to support the findings
and decision of the trial court that they are not.
t

Throughout his brief, appellants' counsel has related evidence favorable to his clients, primarily from
his own clients. In each an¢1. every material fact related
by him such evidence stands in the record postively and
categorically denied by evidenc.e of the Hansens. Of
course, the ultimate purpose of counsel is to impress this
court of claimed equities in favor of his clients. These
respondents submitted to the issues presented. Had the
action been of some other nature, it is not only conceiY26
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able but eYident that equities in respondents' favor would
also haYe appearPd. _An illustration of one of these facts
is the statement that appellants '"'ere willing to perform.
The Hansens denied this statement. It appears that Mr.
Young \vas forced into unhappy and undesirable arrangement by his 'vife (R. 165, 9~) and after a short experience
tried to get out of it, eYen to the point of commencing
litigation against his friends.
Respondent cannot urge too strongly that appellants
failed in one thing, and that was to sustain their own
action that respondents had breached their agreement.
The issue \vas that simple.
The Hansens never suggested nor commenced litigation over this problem, but this costly action wrongfully initiated by the Youngs has been cast upon them.
It is surely no valid complaint that the one sitting in
judgment failed to be impressed by the story of plaintiffs.
It is submitted that there was no error and that the
trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH AND ELTON,
Attorneys for Respondents.
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